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Predictors of customer loyalty in automobile insurance: 
- The role of private information in risky driving behavior and claim history 
  Sara Arvidsson 
VTI*/CTS** 
Abstract:  
Contract-relevant information asymmetries are known to cause inefficien-
cies in markets. The information asymmetry is largest in the beginning of 
the customer-insurer relationship but reduces over time; the longer a poli-
cyholder stays with the insurer the more the insurer learns about the poli-
cyholder’s risk. Two important characteristics of the market studied here 
imply that the information asymmetry may not be reduced for all policy-
holders. First, insurers do not have access to traffic violations, which are 
predictors of risk since policyholders with traffic violations are more likely 
to report a claim. Second, the insurers do not share information, such as 
previous claims, which means that the policyholder can flee a poor claim 
record by switching insurer. Hence, there may be a selection of high risk 
customers who switch insurer more often, such that the information 
asymmetry in this group is never reduced. To test this, we compare infor-
mation asymmetries in two groups of policyholders; new customers who 
stay with the insurer for a period or less (short term), and long-term cus-
tomers who stay with the insurer for several periods (loyal). The results 
indicate that departing policyholders are disproportionately high risks that 
constitute an adverse selection of risks, while loyal policyholders constitute 
a propitious (favorable) selection of risks. 

 1. Introduction 
When studying information asymmetries it is crucial to consider the under-
lying properties of the market; what is common information to both the 
policyholder and the insurer in one market may be private information in 
another. Two such examples are traffic violations and claim history with 
other insurance companies. In some automobile insurance markets this 
information is observable while in others, such as Sweden, it is not.1 The 
information that an insurer can obtain about a new policyholder’s past 
claim history comes from the customers self-reporting. The insurer’s in-
formation about a new policyholder can therefore be expected to be less 
complete and accurate than the claim history possessed by the policy-
holder’s previous insurer. Hence, in the presence of asymmetric informa-
tion the insurer is not able to distinguish between a high and a low risk 
driver that belong to the same risk class on the basis of their observable 
characteristics.  
 
A consequence of this information asymmetry is that a policyholder has 
incentives to switch insurer if a claim is reported. The reason is that the 
policyholder can flee the claim record by the switch and the premium will 
be significantly lower if s/he informs a new insurer that no claim occurred 
in the previous year compared to reporting previous claims (Cohen; 2005).  
 
Nonetheless the information asymmetry is likely to shrink over time since 
the longer a policyholder stays with the insurer the more the insurer learns 
about the policyholder’s risk. Since the insurer observes the outcome (claim 
                                                     
1 In the USA insurers have access to traffic violations and the premium increases if 
the policyholder commits a traffic violation or is fined. In Italy, for instance, the 
insurers have information about previous claims since the policyholder needs a 
certificate of previous claims when switching insurer. 
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or not) in each period, there is a learning effect with loyal customers. In 
several situations and markets the information asymmetry is likely to di-
minish over time, which some studies refer to as a learning effect. One 
example is credit markets where a bank with regular customers gets an 
advantage over other banks, since they learn their risk (Dell’Ariccia et al; 
1999 and Marguez; 2002). Related work in auction theory concerns learn-
ing about rivals’ types in bidding behavior (Laffont and Tirole; 1988 and 
Andreoni et al.; 2006). In the job market current employers are better in-
formed than potential future employers about the abilities of their workers. 
Job switchers are further assumed to be disproportionately less able work-
ers, this is known by the employer who sets a lower wage. This lower wage 
reduces the incentives for high ability workers to switch jobs if they cannot 
signal their type (Waldman; 1999, Golan; 2005 and Pinkston; 2009). A 
learning effect also arises in the insurance market since the insurers learn 
about their loyal policyholders and obtain an information advantage com-
pared to competing insurers. Cohen (2008) further shows that the learning 
effect enables higher profit since long-term policyholders with good claim 
history receive a reduction in their premiums that are lower than the ex-
pected cost.  
 
This paper follows Cohen (2005) by testing if departing policyholders are 
disproportionately those with claims in the period(s) preceding the depar-
ture. The analysis is extended by policyholder’s private information about 
being a risky driver (traffic violations). The purpose is to test if short-term 
policyholders are systematically different from long-term policyholders. We 
expect that the information asymmetry depends on how long the policy-
holder has been a customer of the insurance company. Accordingly, we test 
the hypothesis that there is a selection in terms of loyalty; departing cus-
tomers are more likely risky individuals, while loyal customers are less 
risky individuals. It is expected that the insurers learning effect may differ 
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for under-reporting claim history and not observing traffic violations. The 
reason is that claims are unobservable ex ante but not ex post. In contrast 
to claims, traffic violations are observable both ex ante and ex post. This 
means that the insurer will observe all claims reported during the period, 
while traffic violations will continue to be the policyholder’s private infor-
mation. We expect that policyholders who flee their claim record are more 
likely to report a claim with their new insurer, which implies that a re-
ported claim reduces the probability of loyalty. If a traffic violation contin-
ues to be private information, we further expect that it will not have any 
effect on loyalty. 
 
Conditional on a close replication of the risk classification, made possible 
by access to the insurers’ actuarially predicted risk classification, we test if 
reported at-fault claims and traffic violations affect loyalty. First, we use a 
probit model to test if traffic violations and previous at-fault claims affect 
the policyholders’ decision to leave the company after a period or less. 
Second, we use another probit model to test the effect of traffic violations 
and previous at-fault claims on loyal customers. We use a five-year relation 
proxy for being a loyal customer, since this is the longest policyholder-
insurer relation we can observe in our data.  
 
Our main results indicate that at-fault claims increase the probability of 
leaving the company. One reason is that the market structure makes it 
possible to behave opportunistically and receive a lower premium from 
another insurer. Loyal policyholders are shown to be more likely to be 
claim free during their time as customers, suggesting that they represent a 
lower risk for their insurer. Our findings also indicate that individuals with 
traffic violations are more likely to depart. The prediction ex ante is that 
traffic violations do not affect loyalty if this continues to be the policy-
holder’s private information. There is no reason for the policyholders to 
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depart if their risk type is not revealed. Our conclusion is that either the 
risk type is revealed to the insurer, or, individuals who commit traffic vio-
lations have other characteristics that correlate with the departure decision. 
All in all, our primary conclusion is that departing policyholders are dis-
proportionately high risks who constitute an adverse selection of risks, 
while loyal policyholders constitute a propitious (favorable) selection of 
risks.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the theo-
retical framework while section 3 describes the empirical approach in 
terms of data and econometrics in more detail. Section 4 presents the re-
sults and the section 5 provides the conclusions.  
 
   
2. The theoretical framework 
Swedish insurers do not have access to information about policyholders’ 
traffic violations, even though previous research has established that traffic 
violations are a strong predictor of accidents  (Forward; 2008)  and that 
policyholders with traffic violations are more likely to report a claim where 
s/he was at fault (Arvidsson; 2010). We can therefore define policyholders 
with traffic violations as risky drivers and the insurer cannot, other than by 
observable characteristics, determine who is more likely to be a risky driver 
in terms of violations.  
 
Furthermore, Swedish insurers are not required to share information about 
customers. This implies that previous claims with other companies are 
unobservable, and it is not possible to use other publicly available records 
to decrease this information asymmetry. Insurers therefore ask new policy-
holders to report their past claim history. This self-reporting is viewed as 
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inaccurate by the insurance industry, since policyholders may underreport 
previous claims. This viewpoint is also empirically established by Cohen 
(2005), who finds that departing customers are disproportionately those 
with claims in the period preceding the departure decision. Still, policy-
holders may change insurer for reasons other than a bad record (realloca-
tion, lower prices etc.), which implies that the insurer will not be able to 
fully infer a new customer’s past claims from the decision to switch.  
 
In the beginning of t1 the insurer does not know, other than by observable 
characteristics, whether the policyholder is a high or low risk. In the end of 
t1 the policyholder decides whether or not to stay with the insurer, a deci-
sion that may be affected by claims during the period. If a claim has oc-
curred the premium in t2 is likely to increase, especially if the policyholder 
was partially or fully responsible for the reported claim. Thus, the policy-
holder has an incentive to flee this claim record by switching to a new in-
surer.2 At the end of the first period the company learns more about the 
policyholder type since the number of reported claims during the period is 
observed. This learning effect increases when t increases since the number 
of observations of an individual increases, implying that information 
asymmetries are dealt with over time.  
 
But not all customers are loyal. Before the new insurer learns the new poli-
cyholder’s type, it is possible that s/he switches insurer again, which means 
that the insurance industry may not ever fully learn the type of switching 
policyholders. Accordingly, we test the hypothesis that there is a selection 
of risks in terms of loyalty; departing customers are more likely higher 
risks, while loyal customers are more likely to be lower risks. We expect 
that departing customers are more likely to report at-fault claims and loyal 
                                                     
2 The policyholder may depart from the company for reasons other than switching 
insurer. S/he might decide not to purchase a new insurance policy (and drive unin-
sured) or sell the vehicle.  
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customers to be less likely to report claims. If the policyholder’s risky driv-
ing behavior is revealed to the insurer, we expect that the traffic violations 
to be a predictor of customer loyalty. If risky behavior continues to be 
private, we do not expect traffic violations to be a predictor of loyalty. 
 
 
 3. The empirical framework 
3.1 Data and methodological issues 
The insurer that has provided the main data set consists of 24 regional 
subsidiaries located in all counties in Sweden. Each observation includes all 
information that the insurer has about the policyholder, the vehicle and the 
contract characteristics. All in all, the data consists of approximately 9.3 
million observations on automobile insurance policies for the period 2006-
2008.  To this data set we add private information about the policyholder’s 
risky behavior. The data comprises traffic safety violations in terms of on-
the-spot fines and convictions, which are not accessible to Swedish insur-
ers.3 We distinguish policyholders with one conviction from policyholders 
with several convictions for traffic safety violations. The reason is that we 
believe that relapsed violations are associated with higher risk individuals. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of some of the variables. Appendix A 
provides a complete list of the information in each observation.  
 
                                                     
3 The number of convictions for traffic safety violations is registered by the Swedish 
National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ). These are cases where sanctions are 
made by an attorney, including for example convictions for driving intoxicated and 
driving carelessly, that is, traffic safety violations that lead to more serious sanc-
tions than on-the-spot-fines. Data on on-the-spot fines comes from the RIOB regis-
ter at the Swedish National Police Board (RPS). These fines are divided into speed-
ing and other traffic offences such as running red lights, takeovers in crossings, and 
some other offences due to risky behavior or vehicle flaws. Since RIOB is cleared 
periodically, it is possible to receive at most five years from the current year. 
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The definition of loyalty calls for a remark: Data is not truncated, which 
implies that we can observe customer engagement in the company back in 
time. This enables us to specify customer loyalty for a longer time period 
than 2006-2008. We have created an entry and exit variable for the first 
and last observation of an individual, not the contract. 4 The reason is that 
a contract can be observed as new even though the customer has been with 
the company for years, e.g. if the customer purchases an additional vehicle 
after x years, there will be an observation of a new contract but for an old 
customer. Since the insurer checks the policyholders’ id, the choice is to 
define loyalty in terms of how many periods an individual has stayed with 
the insurer, and not for how many periods a contract lasted. Exit minus 
entry defines the number of years a policyholder stayed with the company. 
We include all contracts that the individual had during their time with the 
company. All loyal customers had at least one contract that started every 
year between entry and exit, which implies that they stayed with the in-
surer for a continuous period of at least five years.  
 
Short-term customers are defined as new policyholders, for whom the in-
surer has no previous observations and who leave the company after one 
period or less. All contracts that the policyholders have during their peri-
ods in the company are included. Specifically, we look at customers that 
departed in 2007 after a year or less. For each policyholder we generate a 
                                                     
4 A note of caution: Since the insurers changed their data system on 1 January 
2006, some individuals who started with the company during 2006 may have 
stayed with the company for a longer period of time. Hence, they may appear as 
new in our data even though they stayed with the insurer for x periods. We do not 
have any indicators for old and new policyholders for that year. The majority, 
however, entered the company before 2006.   
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dummy variable that equals 1 if a policyholder ends the contract and zero 
if s/he continues for another period.5  
 
The nature of this data set calls for an additional remark; a policyholder 
can appear as several observations that are treated as independent by the 
insurer. An example is when a customer insures vehicles of different 
brands. The policyholder receives a separate contract for each of the vehi-
cles, which are treated as separate risks even though they are owned and 
driven by the same individual. For this reason the premiums in the con-
tracts may differ substantially.  
 
To handle data, insurers makes three main assumptions regarding the con-
tracts, which we follow in the empirical analysis; First, there is independ-
ence between contracts meaning that the outcomes for different insurance 
policies are independent, even though the contracts may be owned by the 
same individual. Second, there is time independence in that the outcomes 
(claim or not) in two separate time intervals are independent. This implies 
that we treat repeated contracts as independent observations. Third, ho-
mogeneity is assumed, that is, an outcome with the same exposure has the 
same distribution within a risk group.6 This implies that the insurer does 
not consider any heterogeneity other than observable characteristics. If the 
insurance market handles the information asymmetry regarding traffic 
violations and claims, we should not expect to find any differences between 
                                                     
5 Note that data covers the end of 2008. This implies that if we include departure 
decisions in 2008, we cannot control for whether the policyholder actually departs 
or if the contract only expires and the policyholder renews it during 2009. Since we 
cannot observe the outcome in 2009, the choice is to define departs during 2007 
since we can observe whether or not the policyholder departure or stays during 
2008. 
6 There are several examples when these conditions are violated. One example, 
already discussed, is untruthful reports of the policyholders, which violates homo-
geneity. Furthermore, if two vehicles insured by the same insurer are involved in a 
collision with each other, the independence between contracts could be violated. 
8   
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the two groups. The reason is that there would not be any incentives to 
switch insurer if a claim was reported or if risky behavior was revealed. 
With no information asymmetry there would not be any gains from switch-
ing insurer, since the new insurer would observe the risk type. 
 
We perform a sensitivity analysis of the independence between observa-
tions, where we cluster-adjust the standard errors with respect to policy-
holder-id. The significance levels are slightly affected and the results are in 
Table 1 and 2 in Appendix B. Still, a resolution of the methodological is-
sues associated with these kinds of data is beyond the scope of this paper; 
refined methods are nevertheless a promising field for future methodologi-
cal work. 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
We start the analysis with some descriptive statistics concerning policy-
holders that stayed with the insurer for a period or less (t1), and loyal cus-
tomers that stayed with the insurer for at least five years (t5).  We also look 
at the whole sample to see if there tend to be any differences between the 
groups.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the whole sample, one period customers and repeated customers. 
 Whole  
sample 
Min Max Short-term 
policyholders 
(t1) 
Min Max Long- term  
policyholders 
(t5) 
Min Max 
Number of observations 9 274 116 
 
  73 184   4 274 828      
 
All Risk Insurance  
 
57% 
   
36% 
   
59% 
  
    - Low deductible 
 
78%   74% 
 
 
  79% 
 
 
  
Limited damage insurance  91%   69%   93%   
 
Third part damage insurance  
(compulsory) 
 
94% 
   
95% 
   
93% 
  
 
Average year of birth 
 
1955 
 
1898 
 
2004 
 
1967 
 
1908 
 
1994 
 
1953 
 
1898 
 
1997 
 
One conviction 
 
8% 
   
7% 
   
8% 
  
 
Several convictions 
 
3% 
   
8% 
   
3% 
  
 
Total number of convictions 
  
0 
 
136 
  
0 
 
117 
  
0 
 
37 
 
Traffic offences 
 
8% 
 
0 
 
38 
 
15% 
 
0 
 
30 
 
7% 
 
0 
 
11 
 
Speeding tickets 
 
12% 
 
0 
 
8 
 
16% 
 
0 
 
6 
 
11% 
 
0 
 
7 
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 The share of All Risk Insurance contracts is higher for long-term customers 
(59%) compared to the whole sample (57%) and in particular to policy-
holders that left the company during 2007 (36%). The number that chose 
the lower deductible is about the same in all groups. The share of Limited 
Damage Insurance is highest for long-term policyholders (93%) and lowest 
for policyholders who departed during 2007 (69%). Policyholders with the 
compulsory third party damage insurance are approximately the same in 
the whole sample as for short-term and repeated policyholders (about 
94%). Since this insurance coverage is compulsory for vehicles in traffic, 
about 6% in each group have de-registered vehicles that are not used in 
traffic during the year.  
 
Short-term policyholders are younger than loyal customers in comparison. 
The table shows that the minimum age of the policyholders is below the 
age of 18, which is the legal driving age in Sweden. Until the first of Octo-
ber 2006 it was legal for under-aged people to own a vehicle. This is a 
special group of policyholder who are not likely to be the main users since 
they do not have a driving license. For this reason they are eliminated from 
the analysis (838 observations). 
 
Contracts where the policyholder has one conviction are the same in all 
groups; the share of contracts with a policyholder who has had several 
convictions is higher for departing customers. This is also true when it 
comes to traffic offences and speeding tickets, which may indicate of that 
high risk drivers tend to be short-term policyholders and switch insurer 
more often. 
 
Younger groups tend to have a higher share of fines compared to older 
groups while the opposite is true for convictions. One reason is that fines 
covers a shorter time period (2004-2007) compared to convictions (1973-
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2007), suggesting that the probability of having a conviction increases with 
age while the probability of being fined does not. Females tend to have 
lower frequencies of violations and at-fault claims; they also constitute a 
lower share of vehicle ownership, compared to males. In sum, females and 
younger groups have lower frequencies compared to males, which suggests 
that the results regarding males are more robust. 
 
 
3.3 Econometric approach 
To test if traffic violations and previous claims have any effect on loyalty 
we estimate two probit models where the first equation estimates the effect 
of private information on being a loyal customer. The second equation 
estimates the effect on private information of being a short-term customer. 
The control variables included when studying information asymmetries 
calls for further attention since previous studies have pointed out the im-
portance of a careful conditioning on all the information that is observed 
by the insurance company and used in the premium price (Chiappori and 
Salanié: 2000 and Finkelstein and McGarry; 2006: Cohen and Siegelman; 
2010). A preferred approach is therefore to condition on the company 
actuarial risk classification since this is the basis for the premium and al-
lows the insurer to place policyholders in different risk classes. The risk 
classification variables used in the insurance company’s actuarial model in 
2006-2008 are included in the vector, X. The variables included differ 
slightly in the equations, the reason being that the insurer has more infor-
mation about loyal customers compared to new customers. We clarify the 
variables that are included in each equation below. 
 
In all regressions we perform the analysis on sub groups that consist of the 
age and gender groups used by the insurer in the actuarial model in 2007 
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 and 2008. This provides us with ten groups on which we perform the 
analysis. 
 
The dependent variable in equation (1) takes the value one if the policy-
holder left the company during 2007 after being a customer for a year or 
less and zero otherwise.  
 
Prob(Short term=1) = Φ(X1+NC2+C063+C074+D5 ) (1) 
 
The variable X is a vector that consists of the risk classification variables 
used in the insurance company’s actuarial model in 2006-2008. More spe-
cifically, X in equation (1) consists of age of policyholder, vehicle age, 
kilometer class, vehicle risk classification and residential area risk classifi-
cation.  
 
NC is an indicator variable that takes the value one if no claim was re-
ported during the period. Furthermore C06 and C07 are indicator variables 
taking the value one if the policyholder reported a claim where he or she 
was at fault during 2006 or 2007, respectively; zero otherwise.  
 
D is a vector of four indicator variables; The first takes the value one if the 
policyholder has at least one fine for speeding, or zero otherwise. The sec-
ond takes the value one if the policyholder has received at least one fine for 
traffic offences other than speeding, or zero otherwise. The third indicator 
variable takes the value one if the policyholder has received one conviction 
for traffic safety violations, or zero otherwise. The fourth indicator vari-
able takes the value one if the policyholder has received two or more con-
victions for traffic safety violations, or zero otherwise.  
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The dependent variable of equation (2) takes the value one if the policy-
holder has stayed with the insurance company for at least five years. The 
vector X in equation (2) generally consists of the same explanatory vari-
ables as equation (1). The difference is that information about claims with 
the insurer is added. We have constructed four dummy variables taking the 
value one for one, two, three and four years of no claims, or zero other-
wise.7 These variables are included in the loyal policyholder analysis since 
reported claims during the period are observed by the insurer and used in 
the premium pricing scheme.  
 
Prob(Loyal =1) = Φ (Xδ1+NCδ2+C06δ3+C07δ4+Dδ5) (2) 
 
We are mainly interested in the private information indicators, D, and 
previous claims, C06, C07, from which we can ascertain whether the policy-
holder's private information about risky behavior and reported claims 
differ between loyal and short-term customers.  
 
 
4. Results 
Table 2 reports the marginal effects from probit estimation of equation (1). 
We estimate the relationship of private information and previous at-fault  
claims on the exit decision conditioned on the risk classification, X.
7 According one of the actuaries in our insurance company this variable is equiva-
lent to their bonus variable. 
 Table 2. Departing short-term policyholders  
 22-25 26-29 30-39 40-49 50+ 
 Females Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Mixed 
group 
Mixed 
group 
No reported 
claims 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.007*** 
(0.003) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
At fault 
claim 2006 
 0.172*** 
(0.040) 
0 .090*** 
(0.021) 
 0.059 *** 
(0.017) 
 0.043*** 
(0.010) 
 0.027*** 
(0.008) 
 0.036*** 
(0.007) 
 0.021*** 
(0.004) 
 0.017*** 
(0.002) 
 0.016*** 
(0.002) 
 0.007*** 
(0.001) 
At fault 
claim 2007 
0.025 
(0.025) 
 .092*** 
(0.020) 
 0.024** 
(0.013) 
 0.034*** 
(0.010) 
 0.023*** 
(0.008) 
 0.018*** 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
 0.006*** 
(0.002) 
 0.002*** 
(0.001) 
 0.002*** 
(0.001) 
One  
conviction 
-  0.022* 
(0.014) 
 .110*** 
(0.026) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
 0.009** 
(0.006) 
 0.002** 
(0.001) 
 .003*** 
(0.001) 
 0.002*** 
(0.000) 
 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Several  
convictions 
0.006 
(0.016) 
0.004* 
(0.005) 
 0.019** 
(0.010) 
0.034*** 
(0.003) 
 0.010* 
0.007 
0.028*** 
(0.002) 
0.021*** 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.000) 
 0.006*** 
(0.000) 
Traffic  
offences 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Speeding 
tickets 
0.006 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.008** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
 -0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
Log  
likelihood 
-6380.7 -16007.3 -12068.8 -27307.4 -13690.5 -27537.1 -31803.6 -57469.8 -85917.9 -111679.1 
Likelihood 
ratio 2(17) 
241.10 700.89 569.43 1541.40 741.10 1619.90 1649.11 4341.94 4434.69 6484.75 
N 24 386 61 877 77 580 178 008 143 895 293 587 557 114 1 097 644 2 127 261 4 711 926 
Notes: The reported coefficients are marginal effects from a probit estimation of equation (1). (–) indicates that there are too few observa-
tions and that the variable is not included. *** ,**,* represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Standard er-
rors are in parentheses. See the main text for more details. 
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Consistent with the findings in Cohen (2005) our results suggest that at-
fault claims in the same period, as well as in the previous period, increase 
the probability of leaving the company. Hence, the results indicate that 
departing customers are disproportionately ones with claims the same pe-
riod or the period preceding the departure decision. The results also indi-
cate that no reported claims during the period decrease the probability of 
leaving the insurer. This suggests that lower risk drivers stay with their 
current insurer and have no incentive to end their contract. 
 
Traffic violations in terms of on-the-spot fines and convictions increase the 
probability of departure in all groups. However, speeding decreases the 
probability of leaving the company for females aged 22-25 aged 26-29.  
 
Table 3 reports the results of the marginal probit estimation of equation 
(2), where the relationship of traffic violations and previous claims on be-
ing a long-term customer is estimated. Policyholders in the age groups 18-
21 have been removed from the loyal customer analysis since they are too 
young to have been with the company for at least five years.8 
                                                     
8 A policyholder can take a driving license at the age of 18 in Sweden. After 1 Oc-
tober 2006 it became illegal for individuals under 18 years old to own a vehicle. 
This implies that the age group 18-21 could have owned their vehicles, but could 
only have been customers for 0-3 years. 
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 Table 3. Loyal policyholders  
 22-25 26-29 30-39 40-49 50+ 
 Females Males Females Males Females Males Mixed 
group 
Mixed 
group 
No reported claims 
 
 0.036*** 
(0.005) 
 0.031*** 
(0.004) 
 0.051*** 
(0.004) 
 0.045*** 
(0.003) 
 0.046*** 
(0.003) 
 0.034*** 
(0.002) 
 0.040*** 
(0.001) 
 0.031*** 
(0.001) 
At fault claim 2006  -0.012 
(0.020) 
 -0.039** 
(0.014) 
 -0.045** 
(0.017) 
 -0.052*** 
(0.014) 
 -0.053*** 
(0.011) 
 -0.073*** 
(0.008) 
 -0.065*** 
(0.006) 
 -0.066*** 
(0.004) 
At fault claim 2007 -0.042** 
(0.018) 
-0.048*** 
(0.014) 
-0.070** 
(0.017) 
-0.064*** 
(0.014) 
 -0.043*** 
(0.011) 
-0.056*** 
(0.009) 
-0.043*** 
(0.006) 
-0.013*** 
(0.004) 
One conviction -0.081*** 
(0.017) 
 0.009** 
(0.005) 
-0.024* 
(0.014) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.019*** 
(0.004) 
-0.021*** 
(0.002) 
-0.022*** 
(0.001) 
-0.032*** 
(0.001) 
Several convictions -0.102*** 
(0.009) 
-0.078*** 
(0.003) 
-0.181*** 
(0.009) 
-0.127*** 
(0.004) 
 -0.123*** 
(0.008) 
-0.119*** 
(0.002) 
-0.108*** 
(0.002) 
-0.120*** 
(0.002) 
Traffic offences -0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.027*** 
(0.002) 
 0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.031*** 
(0.002) 
-0.051*** 
(0.003) 
-0.040*** 
(0.001) 
-0.043*** 
(0.001) 
-0.024*** 
(0.001) 
Speeding tickets  0.029*** 
(0.004) 
 -0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.030*** 
(0.001) 
-0.027*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
Log likelihood -31386.8 -77605.6 -73187.8 -165713.5 -325405.7 -689935.7 -1328065.5 -2614966.8 
Likelihood ratio 
χ2(17) 
4302.51 7694.75 13381.52 19822.90 77385.38 110 000 290 000 1 300 000 
N 77 580 178 008 143 895 293 587 557 114 1 097 644 2 127 261 4 711 926 
Notes: The reported coefficients are marginal effects from a probit estimation of equation (2). *** ,**,* represents signifi-
cance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. See the main text for more details. 
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 Table 3 further shows that the probability of being a loyal customer in-
creases if the policyholder does not report a claim during the period. Simi-
larly at fault claims during the period, and the one before, decrease the 
probability of being a loyal customer. The results further indicate that in-
dividuals with traffic violations are less likely to be loyal customers. 
 
Taken together the results in Table 2 and 3 suggest that policyholders with 
previous claims and traffic violations increase the probability of leaving the 
company after one year or less. Policyholders that commit traffic violations 
and report claims are less likely to be loyal customers. This suggests that 
the information asymmetry differs in the two groups; Short-term customers 
tend to be more risky, while loyal customers are less risky.  
 
As previously mentioned there are lower frequencies of traffic violations 
and at-fault claims for females, and young females in particular, which 
implies that the results for these groups tend to be more sensitive to 
changes in the independent variables compared to male groups and mixed 
gender groups.   
 
Another note of caution regards the results for traffic violations. Since 
these the policyholder’s private information both ex ante and ex post (if 
type is not revealed), we expect traffic violations to have an insignificant 
effect on the exit decision. There is no reason why policyholders should 
depart if they do not reveal their information to the insurer. We know that 
individuals who commit traffic violations are more likely to makes at-fault 
claims, which means that the observed relationship may have some indirect 
effect on the exit decision. There may, however, be other characteristics of 
these individuals that make them more prone to flee the company and less 
likely to be loyal.  
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 5. Conclusions 
In this paper we find that at-fault claims and traffic violations affect 
whether or not a customer is loyal to the insurance company; loyalty is 
defined as the number of years the customer stays with the insurer. Our 
results suggest that private information on convictions, e.g. for driving 
intoxicated, and/or on-the spot fines, such as for running red lights, in-
creases the probability of leaving the insurer after one period or less. Con-
sistent with these findings we show that risky behavior decreases the prob-
ability of being a loyal customer.  
 
Moreover, our results support the findings by Cohen (2005) in that previ-
ous claims affect the departure decision when claims history with other 
insurers is private information. Once a claim is reported there are eco-
nomic incentives for the policyholder to switch insurer and flee the claim 
record. The reason is that high risks can mimic a low risk one by underre-
porting claims; thus the premium will be lower at a new insurer compared 
to staying with the current insurer to whom the claim is reported. As in the 
study by Cohen we cannot control for whether departing customers actu-
ally purchase insurance elsewhere, since there is a possibility that some 
departing customers leave the insurer and drive uninsured or decide not to 
own a vehicle anymore. 
 
Previous research has established that policyholders that commit violations 
are more likely to report an at-fault claim. Still, since traffic violations are 
the policyholder’s private information there are no reasons to expect that 
policyholders switch insurer with the purpose of hiding their risk type, at 
least if it is not revealed to their current insurer. Since we control for at-
fault claims during the same period and the period preceding the departure, 
as well as the insurers’ risk classification, there are reasons to believe that 
the purpose of their departure is not to hide their risk type. There may, 
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 however, be other characteristics of individuals who commit traffic viola-
tions, unobservable to us and possibly observed by the insurer, that affect 
the departure decision. The characteristics of individuals who commit traf-
fic violations need further investigation. Despite this, we conclude that 
risky driving behavior affects customer loyalty.  
 
All in all, our findings suggest that short-term customers constitute an ad-
verse selection of risks, and are more likely to commit traffic violations and 
report claims. Loyal customers, on the other hand, constitute a propitious 
(favorable) selection of risks, loyal customers are less likely to commit traf-
fic violations and report claims. Another indicator of loyalty is that they 
are more likely to be claim-free during their time as a customer with the 
insurer. The results support the notion that the market suffers from oppor-
tunistic behavior, since short-term departure customers are disproportion-
ately those with claims; once a claim is reported there are incentives to 
switch company.  
 
Our conclusion is that the automobile insurance market would benefit 
from sharing information about traffic violations and/or claim records with 
other insurers since this will likely reduce opportunistic behavior. In some 
countries premiums are already based on fines for traffic safety violations. 
If the policyholder receives a speeding ticket, the premium increases for 
some period of time, and with several tickets within some time period x, 
the premium increases dramatically. Premiums depending on traffic viola-
tions further provide incentives to comply with the traffic laws. An addi-
tional benefit is that violations are a more direct measurement of risky 
behavior and are likely better predictors of future claims than the current 
risk classification used by the insurers. With access to information about 
traffic violations and/or previous claims with other insurers, it is possible 
20   
 
 for insurers to adjust the premium ex ante a claim rather than ex post, 
which increases the actuarial fairness.  
 
It is possible to reduce the information asymmetry without high admini-
stration costs, the reason being that insurers have access to a common 
claim register and can this check policyholders’ self-reports of previous 
claims from the year 2000 onwards. The insurers are not allowed to use 
this information to check the honesty of new customer, though. The inter-
est in information pooling systems has been debated within the European 
Union, and systems of information pooling existed in Belgium and France 
but were ruled out by the European Commission since this behavior was 
considered as anticompetitive (Cohen; 2008). Despite this there are other 
ways to reduce the information asymmetry. In Italy, for instance, the indi-
vidual has to bring a certificate of previous claims from the previous in-
surer when applying for insurance from a new company. This reduces the 
inefficiency associated with non-observable claim history (See Ceccarini; 
2007). Our primary conclusion is that accessing contract-relevant informa-
tion on violations and the claim history of new policyholders will reduce 
the market inefficiencies associated with the opportunistic behavior consid-
ered in this paper. Approaching first best will nevertheless require amend-
ments to the information-sharing between authorities and insurers. 
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Appendix A 
 
The data covers the time period 2006-2008. Each observation in the 
data set contains the following information:  
1. Demographic characteristics of the policyholder: individual id-
number, year of birth, gender, home district and self-reported 
number of kilometers driven per year. 
2. Residential area risk classification: the actuarially predicted risk in 
the neighborhood where the policyholder lives. Each type of insur-
ance coverage (Traffic Insurance, Limited Damage Insurance and 
All Risk Insurance) has a classification. All policyholders have 
each classification regardless of coverage.  
3. Car characteristics: vehicle model, brand, construction year, size of 
engine and vehicle-id. 
4. Vehicle risk classification: the actuarial risk classification regarding 
the vehicle. As with residential area risk classification, each type of 
insurance coverage has a risk classification regarding the vehicle.  
5. Private information: The number of on-the-spot fines for speeding 
or other traffic offences of the policyholder during 2004-2007, and 
the number of convictions a policyholder had during 1973-2007. 
6. The type of policy purchased: Traffic Insurance (required if the car 
is in use but not if it is deregistered), Limited Damage Insurance, 
All Risk Insurance (not generally required for new cars since most 
manufacturers provide assurance) and Additional insurance. 
7. Deductible Choice: The only contract providing deductible choice 
(high or low deductible) is All Risk Insurance. 
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8. Premium: The price of the insurance policy. 
9. Period covered: From-date and to-date for each period in the con-
tracts. The number of days with insurance is between 1-365 days 
for one period.  
10. Realization of risk: Claims submitted by the policyholder and in-
formation on which insurance covers the claim. It is also possible 
to identify the level of at-fault in the claim (none, partial or full re-
sponsibility).  
11. Driver information: The insurer’s information on the identity of 
the reported driver in an accident (not necessarily the policy-
holder), age, gender and personal identity number and private in-
formation according to (5). Note that additional drivers are the 
policyholder’s private information since the premium is not de-
pendent on drivers other than the vehicle owner. 
12. Other variables: Household identity, two or more policyholders in 
the same household share the same household-id.   
 
 
 Appendix B.  
Table 1. Departing short-term policyholders (cluster adjusted standard errors) 
 18-21 22-25 26-29 30-39 40-49 50+ 
 Females Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Mixed 
group 
Mixed 
group 
No reported  
claims 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
 -0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
At fault claim  
2006 
0.172*** 
(0.040) 
0.090*** 
(0.021) 
0.059 *** 
(0.017) 
0.034*** 
(0.010) 
0.027*** 
(0.008) 
0.036*** 
(0.007) 
0.021*** 
(0.004) 
0.017*** 
(0.002) 
0.016*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
At fault claim  
2007 
0.025 
(0.025) 
 0.092*** 
(0.020) 
0.024** 
(0.013) 
0.034*** 
(0.010) 
0.023*** 
(0.008) 
0.018*** 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
One 
conviction 
- 0.022 
(0.024) 
0.108** 
(0.083) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Several 
convictions 
0.006 
(0.022) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.019* 
(0.014) 
0.034*** 
(0.005) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
0.028*** 
(0.004) 
0.021*** 
(0.005) 
0.013*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.000) 
0.006*** 
(0.000) 
Traffic  
offences 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Speeding  
tickets 
0.006 
(0.012) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.008** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
Log  
pseudolikeli-
hood 
-6380.6 -16007.3 -12068.8 -27307.4 -13690.4 -27537.1 -31803.6 -57469.8 -85917.9 -111679.1 
Wald  χ2 125.03 358.55 252.05 635.87 335.69 679.73 837.06 1801.78 2058.06 6484.75 
N 24 386 61 877 77 580 178 008 143 895 293 587 557 114 1 097 644 2 127 261 4 711 926 
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Table 2. Loyal policyholders and private information (clustered adjusted standard errors) 
 22-25 26-29 30-39 40-49 50+ 
 Females Males Females Males Females Males Mixed 
group 
Mixed 
group 
No reported 
claims 
0.036*** 
(0.005) 
 0.031*** 
(0.004) 
 0.051*** 
(0.005) 
 0.045*** 
(0.004) 
0.046*** 
(0.003) 
 0.034*** 
(0.002) 
 0.040*** 
(0.002) 
0.031*** 
(0.001) 
At fault claim 
2006 
-0.012 
(0.022) 
-0.039** 
(0.014) 
-0.045** 
(0.019) 
-0.052*** 
(0.015) 
-0.053*** 
(0.012) 
-0.073*** 
(0.009) 
-0.065*** 
(0.007) 
-0.066*** 
(0.005) 
At fault claim 
2007 
-0.042* 
(0.021) 
-0.048*** 
(0.014) 
-0.070*** 
(0.019) 
-0.064*** 
(0.015) 
-0.043*** 
(0.013) 
-0.056*** 
(0.010) 
-0.043*** 
(0.007) 
-0.013*** 
(0.005) 
One  
conviction 
-0.081*** 
(0.031) 
0.009 
(0.014) 
-0.024 
(0.044) 
0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.019 
(0.013) 
-0.021*** 
(0.005) 
-0.022*** 
(0.004) 
-0.032*** 
(0.003) 
Several  
convictions 
-0.102** 
(0.026) 
-0.078*** 
(0.009) 
-0.181*** 
(0.020) 
-0.127*** 
(0.011) 
-0.123*** 
(0.024) 
-0.119*** 
(0.007) 
-0.108*** 
(0.006) 
-0.120*** 
(0.005) 
Traffic  
offences 
-0.008 
(0.013) 
-0.027*** 
(0.006) 
 0.011 
(0.014) 
-0.031*** 
(0.006) 
-0.051*** 
(0.009) 
-0.040*** 
(0.005) 
-0.043*** 
(0.004) 
-0.024*** 
(0.004) 
Speeding 
tickets 
0.029*** 
(0.011) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.030*** 
(0.004) 
-0.027*** 
(0.003) 
   -0.007*** 
(0.003) 
Log pseudoli-
kelihood 
-31389.288 -77605.58 -73187.773 -165713.48 -325408.72 -689935.84 -1328065.5 -2614966.8 
Wald χ2(17) 944.45 1759.10 2999.13 4150.75 14857.54 20052.56 56266.36 230000 
N 77 580 178 008 143 895 293 587 557 114 1 097 644 2 127 261 4 711 926 
 
 
 
 
 
